Key processes in September 2022

1. Ukraine mounted a successful counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region and recaptured the town of Lyman and the outskirts of Donbas. In the southern direction, the counter-offensive was largely unsuccessful, though.

2. The Kharkiv counter-offensive became possible due to the insufficient number of Russian troops in that operational area, which turned into the final argument that tipped the scale in favour of mobilisation in the Russian Federation.

3. The mobilisation announced by Moscow and the annexation of four Ukrainian regions against the backdrop of the rapid removal of restrictions on Western arms supplies to Ukraine mark the onset of an all-new phase of military escalation.

4. The risks of more active involvement of third countries in the war, spread of armed hostilities to new countries, and a particularly dangerous scenario when the war in Ukraine fuses with conflicts elsewhere in the world have surged. In the worst possible case, the latter could evolve into a mechanism for a local war to escalate into a network of inter-related global conflicts.

5. The already meagre peacebuilding attempts hold even less promise. This situation will persist until either escalation comes close to a nuclear conflict, or mutual exhaustion affects those on the battlefield, or the magnitude of the economic crisis generates overriding public demand for the war to end.

6. The socio-economic consequences of the war cause growing discontent in the West and may undermine the political centrism that has consolidated many nations.

Frontline developments, mobilisation, referendums, and nuclear weapons

The main military highlight was the rapid counter-offensive delivered by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in the Kharkiv region, which made it possible to liberate about 3,000 square kilometres of the country’s territory. By the end of September, Ukraine had also regained control of the strategically important town of Lyman following long battles. Those achievements were made possible by the withdrawal of the already small contingent of Russian troops from that operational area. The counter-offensive in the south, which is Russia’s priority, was largely unsuccessful.

Despite the increasing supplies of Western arms and training assistance, the AFU is gradually losing its best combat-capable forces. All of the AFU’s strategic successes have so far been attained through the heroism of Ukrainian fighters and their ability to use Soviet and domestic weapons, while the role and advantages of Western equipment still remain unclear.

Ukraine’s military successes that came on the back of the scarcity of the Russian contingent became the ultimate argument for the proponents of mobilisation in the Russian Federation. The increase in the AFU strength after several waves of mobilisation in the spring and summer resulted in a modified configuration on the extensive frontline, which ultimately denied Russia the opportunity to continue fighting the war while using a limited contingent. The announced partial mobilisation will hardly fundamentally change the situation on the frontlines, but it will help to achieve parity in manpower and make new fast counterattacks by Ukraine quite unlikely.

The mobilisation decree contains no deadline or the total number of reservists to be called up, which empowers the Russian leadership to go beyond the declared 300,000 target. In addition to purely military objectives, the mobilisation is likely to have a political purpose: to put pressure on Ukraine and the West in order to resume the negotiation process. It looks like the Russian command will continue to use contractors, PMCs and fighters from Ukrainian regions (primarily Donbas) for the riskiest and strike operations. This is evidenced by the recruitment of fighters for PMCs in prisons and legislative initiatives to involve prisoners in the army.

Russia’s annexation of the territories of Donbas and two regions in the south of Ukraine has several objectives. First, to enshrine its territorial acquisitions in case hostilities develop according to a scenario that turns out negative for Russia: this should build up motivation to defend them, as well as constitute grounds for the use of the entire range of defence means, including nuclear weapons.

Third, Moscow may be seeking to end hostilities soon, as it has achieved its immediate objective (to secure a land corridor to Crimea plus the secession of Donbas) and for this reason, inter alia, is looking to enshrine new borders.

Western supplies of heavy weapons to Ukraine, as well as the annexation of the new territories and mobilisation in Russia, have taken the escalation of the conflict to a whole new level. Nuclear war is now entrenched in the world media and political discourse. The Kremlin’s estimates in the new situation were illustrated by Deputy Head of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev: “Let us imagine that Russia is compelled to use its most formidable weapons against the Ukrainian regime [...] I believe that even in this case NATO will not interfere directly in the conflict. After all, the security of Washington, London, Brussels is a lot more important for the North Atlantic Alliance than the fate of the washed-up dying Ukraine, even if it is abundantly supplied with various weapons. [...] Therefore, they will swallow the use of any weapons in the current conflict.” The U.S., for its part, claims that it takes the nuclear issue “extremely seriously”, but also promises Russia “catastrophic consequences” if nuclear weapons should be used in Ukraine.

Prospects for scaling up the war

The political and media aftermath of the Kharkiv counter-offensive is akin to the “Bucha effect” as a trigger behind the increase in the scale and quality of arms supplies to Ukraine. Despite the fact that in the Kharkiv region, the AFU were actually occupying vacant territories following the withdrawal of Russian troops, the counter-offensive is used as evidence of the effectiveness of Western arms supplies. This is further reinforced by the factor of the unrecognised referendums, after which the U.S. is already openly saying that it will support Kyiv’s efforts to return its territories. Consequently, Ukraine’s demand for financing and arms has also been growing.

In response to the referendums, the U.S. provided another, 22nd, military aid package of USD 1.1 billion, which includes 18 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), associated munitions, various types of anti-drone systems and radar systems. These weapons will not come from the U.S. stocks, though, but will be ordered from manufacturers, which implies a 6 to 24-month delay in deliveries and once again confirms Washington’s expectations of a prolonged war.

For example, Germany will deliver (not before 2025, though) to Ukraine 18 RCH 155 (remote controlled howitzer 155 mm), a state-of-the-art artillery system with a range of 54 kilometres. Earlier Berlin already handed over 18 Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers (with a range of 40 kilometres). For his part, Christoph Heusgen, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, called for providing Kyiv with Leopard tanks, which may require a consortium of stakeholders. The overall political situation in Europe does not rule out the implementation of this proposal.

An important background process is the comprehensive return of Germany as a military power in the region, which can already be treated as fait accompli. Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Berlin’s defence policy must respond to the Russian threat and therefore his government intended to “lay the foundations for a new Bundeswehr” that would form “the backbone of a conventional defence system in Europe and become the best-equipped armed force in Europe.” According to Scholz, building a new army requires not only material means, but also “new thinking at all levels of the Bundeswehr, together with self-confidence and a willingness to take risks.” Scholz urged German officers to carry this “spirit of enthusiasm and change” into the troops.

In the context of the war, the dangerous trend towards a dramatic widening of the Overton window in Europe has also gained momentum. It has recently been manifested by explosions on the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines. It is becoming normal for the parties to the conflict (Russia and the West) to adopt an expanded toolkit of confrontation methods, which until recently has been perceived as unthinkable.

Furthermore, other conflicts also appear to be increasingly “embedded” into the geopolitical confrontation around Ukraine. This is particularly evident in the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict, where all stakeholders encounter, one way or another, the effects of the Ukrainian crisis and are trying to use them to their advantage. Particularly indicative are initiatives in Armenia, where voices in favour of “drifting” away from Russia are stronger than ever. In many ways, similar associations of local conflicts with that in Ukraine can be observed in the Balkans (the Serbia–Kosovo conflict) and in the Middle East (instability in Iran). In other words, we can speak of the commencement of the most dangerous process — the gradual fusion of the varied global conflict scenarios into one.

Futility of peacebuilding until a more critical moment

In his address inaugurating the annexation of new territories to Russia Putin reiterated his readiness to negotiate with Ukraine. However, it is clear that the possibility of such negotiations has become even more remote. In the same address, the Russian president refused to consider the return of the annexed territories as a subject of negotiations.


Put another way, Russia once again made it clear that by postponing the start of negotiations, Kyiv only compromises its negotiating position, because each new rung on the escalation ladder makes Moscow exclude from the negotiating agenda new issues that are important for Ukraine. Kyiv, for its part, inspired by its battlefield successes and enhanced Western support, has abandoned the very idea of negotiations under the current conditions altogether. In response to the annexation of the territories by Russia, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine “acknowledged the unfeasibility of negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin.”

Even before Russia declared the referendums, Kyiv published recommendations on possible security guarantees. The document is a non-paper, drafted by a team of experts and former high-ranking politicians, who acted in their personal capacity. However, given that the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine co-chaired the working group and that the document was posted on the president’s website suggests that it was perceived by Kyiv as an official starting position. This very position was formulated by Zelenskyy in conjunction with the application for NATO membership under the fast-track procedure.

At the same time, amid growing escalation, both Russia and the West have actively recalled the lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, one of which envisages the importance of combining tough public rhetoric with an active search for mutually acceptable solutions via closed diplomatic channels. Moscow and Washington confirm that they conduct a non-public dialogue at a “very high level”, although so far it has remained “sporadic”. Until the conflict escalates even further, this dialogue probably serves primarily as a tool to exchange signals and clarify positions. Expert (Track-2) meetings are designed to help find hypothetical solutions, but they, too, are extremely few and irregular.

Despite the general futility of peacemaking efforts and mediation in the current framework, it is nevertheless important to point to a sporadic success — the largest prisoner swap since the start of the war. Viktor Medvedchuk and 55 Russians were exchanged for 215 Ukrainians, including 108 members of the Azov battalion. As part of the arrangement, 10 foreigners previously sentenced to death by a DNR court were released through the mediation of Saudi Arabia. The implementation of the grain deal is also underway.

Socio-political implications of the war for Western countries

Against the deteriorating socio-economic backdrop in most Western countries, including as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and Russian sanctions–counter-sanctions spiral, the first signs of a crisis of liberal consensus and consolidation around political centrism become conspicuous in the EU. In September, those were manifested in the significant electoral success of the extreme right in Italy and Sweden and protests in other member states, which appear to have gathered momentum. It is premature to talk about sustainable trends, but in the longer term, the political foundations in many European countries may face extremely serious challenges.

Surveys conducted in Germany, for example, are indicative of a marked decline in confidence in traditional parties over recent months. According to the Eurobarometer, only 30% of Germans trust political parties. Polls conducted by the German Civil Service Federation showed that only 29% of civil servants believe that the German government is efficient and competent (two years ago, the proportion was 56%). The situation is further aggravated by numerous problems with the reception of Ukrainian refugees. Serious political complications may begin to emerge in the near future: the growing popularity of the extreme right and the extreme left is superimposed on the intra-government struggle, in which the SPD, with its popularity falling, is losing ground to the Greens.